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11 Introduction
Anti-discrimination policy is an important element of labour market inter-
vention by government. Yet it is an extremely di±cult area in which to
devise policies that are e®ective in reducing apparent discrimination without
also being damaging to the e±cient working of the labour market. In the
USA, explicit sex discrimination in pay was made illegal by the 1963 Equal
Pay Act, and more broadly de¯ned discrimination on grounds of sex, race,
colour, religion or national origin was made illegal in pay, promotion, hiring
and ¯ring by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In Britain, policy developed in a
similar way. The 1970 Equal Pay Act (implemented in 1975) made formal
sex discrimination in collective pay bargains illegal; it was further extended
by the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act. The 1965 Race Relations Act was ini-
tially concerned mainly with public order issues, but was extended to cover
direct discrimination in employment in 1968. The 1976 Race Relations Act
broadened the scope of the legislation to cover indirect discrimination in a
very similar way to the American Civil Rights Act, and gave individuals the
right to apply directly for redress. The British Equal Opportunities Com-
mission and Commission for Racial Equality, and the system of Employment
Tribunals, perform an enforcement function similar to that of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission in the USA.1
Within a short time of the introduction of this legislation in the 1970s,
the bulk of openly discriminatory practices were largely eliminated and this
accounts for the sharp permanent reduction in pay di®erentials that we ob-
serve in time-series data at that time (see Freeman (1973), Card and Krueger
(1989) for the USA and Zabalza and Tzannatos (1985) for the UK). After
this ¯rst phase, most remaining discriminatory practices are indirect or dis-
guised in some way, and come within the scope of the broader de¯nitions of
discrimination used by the later legislation (and which hinge on ill-de¯ned
concepts like comparable worth). Disputes now relate mostly to discrimina-
tory treatment alleged to be received by individual employees in spite of the
ostensibly non-discriminatory formal practices adopted by their employers.
Thus judgements tend to deal more with arguable individual cases than with
explicit contractual terms a®ecting large numbers of workers, and they are
1See Bourn and Whitmore (1996) for an account of British law and its similarities with
American legislation.
2more likely to involve individual redress and compensation than the simple
banning of discriminatory practices. Moreover, current anti-discrimination
policy relies heavily on the willingness of individual workers to initiate action.
There is a delicate balance to be struck in the design of policy. If the
expected costs of Tribunal action brought by workers is too high, then equal
pay legislation may reduce demand for labour from the disadvantaged groups,
thus worsening their labour market prospects (Pudney, 1999). On the other
hand, if the legal apparatus is too formidable for the most disadvantaged
individuals to contemplate, then policy will be ine®ective since the most
serious cases will often not be brought forward for redress.
In this study we examine evidence on the propensity of workers to make
use of anti-discrimination processes and the relationship of this propensity to
`objective' measures of disadvantage. Pay di®erentials are used as the main
indicators of race/gender disadvantage. The early empirical literature on race
and gender pay di®erentials predominantly used regression analysis applied
to data on individual employees to estimate di®erences in earnings that ap-
pear attributable only to the race or gender characteristics of an individual,
rather than to education and other attributes underlying true productiv-
ity. Recently, the characteristics of the employer have been brought more to
attention, with the increasing availability of data sources that generate infor-
mation simultaneously on the employee and the employer (see Haltiwanger,
et al (1999) for recent examples). These matched datasets constitute an
important advance. True discrimination stems from a source such as the
preferences of managers, the prejudices of customers or the social culture of
the workplace. As such, it relates to the establishment as a whole rather
than any particular individual's situation. Consequently, it is commonality
of adverse experience for particular ethnic/gender groups within establish-
ments that is the important issue. The availability of information on workers
clustered within establishments allows the commonality of treatment to be
examined.
This aspect of discrimination leads naturally to the class of multi-level
random-e®ects statistical models that are currently receiving a great deal
of attention (see Goldstein (1995) for a survey and Aitkin and Longford
(1986) and Anderson and Aitkin (1985) for typical applications in the sta-
tistical literature). The standard methodology is extended here by using the
occurrence of internal grievance cases and external Tribunal cases as addi-
tional indicators of perceived discrimination. This leads to a novel type of
3model involving ¯rm-level random e®ects and a complex nonlinear system
of multiple outcome indicators. We use this model to assess the strength
and nature of the relationship between apparent discrimination in pay and
workers' readiness to resort to some form of grievance proceedings.
We begin in section 2 with a very simple illustrative model. We then
describe in sections 3 and 4 the matched survey data used for this modelling
exercise and the econometric framework for the analysis. Section 5 presents
the model estimates and uses simulation to summarise their implications.
2 The grievance process
Consider a representative employee. This individual's human capital is such
that he or she could expect to earn a wage w. However, he or she is employed
by a ¯rm whose pay policy may systematically di®er from the labour market
in general, so that the relevant wage with the current employer would be
w+f. A high-wage ¯rm will have f>0 and a low wage ¯rm will have f<0.
However, now suppose that this person is a member of a disadvantaged group.
Employers in general pay individuals of this type a wage w ¡ ¹,w h e r e¹ is
the average degree of pay discrimination in the labour market. The employer
of our hypothetical individual may be more or less discriminatory than the
market in general, so the individual is actually receiving a wage w ¡ d.
De¯ne P(d) to be the probability of success for this individual if he or she
initiates a grievance/tribunal procedure, where P0(d) > 0. Assume that there
are no costs associated with making a complaint and that a successful case
always results in the elimination of all pay discrimination for this individual,
so that his or her pay after a successful complaint will be w + f.I fac a s e
is initiated but proves unsuccessful, the complainant has two options: to
remain with the same employer su®ering the same level of discrimination
d as before, but also a degree of unpleasant `stigma' S. The other option
after an unsuccessful complaint would be to quit, in which case he or she
could expect to su®er the market average level of discrimination, ¹.T h u s
the individual is faced with a choice between the following four courses of
action.
4Table 1 Options and expected payo®s (relative to w)
Option Expected payo®
Status quo f ¡ d
Immediate exit ¡¹
Initiate grievance and remain P(d)f +( 1¡ P(d))(f ¡ d ¡ S)
if unsuccessful
Initiate grievance and quit P(d)f +( 1¡ P(d))(¡¹)
if unsuccessful
Assume the worker chooses the option with the greatest expected payo®.
First note that, if (f + ¹) < 0 the worker will always choose to leave the
¯rm rather than initiate a grievance.2 Thus we need only consider the case
(f + ¹) > 0, when exit is never optimal. Then a grievance will be initiated
if and only if one or other of the following two conditions is satis¯ed:
S<min
(
f ¡ (d ¡ ¹);
Pd
(1 ¡ P)
)
(1)
d>maxff + ¹ ¡ S; (1 ¡ P)(f + ¹)g (2)
Condition (1) relates to the case where an unsuccessful complainant will
remain with the ¯rm and su®er the resulting stigma, while condition (2)
relates to those who would quit the ¯rm in the event of an unsuccessful
complaint.
Figures 1 and 2 show the way the outcome of this decision would vary with
the ¯rm's wage premium f, its degree of discrimination d and the stigma S
anticipated by the worker. If the subjective assessment of stigma S 2 (0;1)
is regarded as randomly distributed across individuals, then we can infer from
¯gures 1 and 2 the way in which the probability of a grievance action is related
to d and f. The shaded areas correspond to regions in which an action will
2Note however that he or she will accept the status quo if (f +¹) < 0a n dt h e r ei sv e r y
strong positive discrimination with d<(f + ¹).
5be initiated. Vertical shading corresponds to condition (1), while horizontal
shading corresponds to condition (2) (`stayers' and `quitters' respectively).
The implications of this simple model are clear. The probability of action
rises smoothly as the ¯rm's degree of discrimination d increases, until it
reaches a critical level d¤, at which point the probability of action jumps
to 1. However, the ¯rm's general level of pay is also relevant. For a given
degree of ¯rm-speci¯c discrimination, ¯gure 2 shows that, as the general wage
premium f rises from a very low value, the probability of action stays at 1
until a critical value f¤ = d=(1¡P)¡¹ is reached, at which point there is a
quantum reduction to a lower ¯xed level. This negative relation implies that
it is easier for high-wage ¯rms to get away with discrimination than it is for
low-wage ¯rms, since the employees of high-wage ¯rms have more to lose by
complaining. This would suggest that we might ¯nd a positive correlation
between f and d in a cross-section of employers.
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Figure 1: The relationship between the use of grievance procedures and ¯rm-
speci¯c excess discrimination
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Figure 2: The relationship between the use of grievance procedures and the
¯ r m - s p e c i ¯ cw a g ep r e m i u m
8This model is, of course, far too simple to apply directly to data but
it does indicate the nature of the relationship we might expect to ¯nd in
data on the wage determination and grievance processes. It also makes clear
that worker-initiated action bears only an indirect relationship with a ¯rm's
degree of discrimination. If the labour market in general is discriminatory (¹
large), if stigma is great or if the probability of success at tribunal is low, then
the relationship between an individual's experience of discrimination and his
or her resort to anti-discrimination measures may be very weak indeed.. We
discuss possible omissions from and extensions to this conventional view of
the grievance process in section 5 when the empirical results are discussed.
3 The WERS data
Our data are taken from the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey
(WERS). WERS is essentially a conventional strati¯ed survey of establish-
ments, drawn from the population of establishments with 10 or more em-
ployees. The o±cial register of businesses known as the Inter-Departmental
Business Register (IDBR) is used as a sampling frame, and within the IDBR,
establishments with 10 or more workers account for some 82.9% of the pop-
ulation of individual employees (Cully 1998b). Fieldwork was carried out in
October 1997-June 1998, with a target sample of 3192 workplaces, yielding
2729 in-scope contacts. The main form of contact was through face-to-face
interviews with the 2193 managers who agreed to cooperate: a response rate
of 80%. In addition to the manager of the establishment, an interview was
conducted with a worker representative (often a union o±cial), and with a
random sample of up to 25 members of the workforce. Of the 44,078 worker
questionnaires issued, 28,323 were returned, implying a 64% response rate.
The worker questionnaires used a self-completion format, without direct in-
terviewer involvement.
We make use of both management and worker questionnaire responses in
this research. The former are used to give information on the nature of the
workplace, business conditions and the employer's experience of discrimination-
related grievances. The worker questionnaires are used to generate infor-
mation on ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, age, experience and
occupational class. We use the subsets of establishments and workers who
supplied complete information on critical variables, and we restrict atten-
9tion to full-time employees only. This results in a sample of 20,660 observed
workers who are linked to a set of 2160 sampled ¯rms. The sample char-
acteristics of the establishments are summarised in Table 2. Both weighted
and unweighted averages are given: note the sample bias in favour of large
establishments. Sample characteristics of employees are given in Appendix
Table A1.
10Table 2 Sample means of establishment characteristics
(unweighted averages; weighted averages in parentheses)
Mean¤ Mean¤ Mean¤ Mean¤
(no (at least 1 (no (at least 1
Variable grievance) grievance) Variable grievance) grievance)
Proportion of 0.501 0.463 Workforce 214.9 981.9
women (0.541) (0.445) (54.1) (248.0)
Proportion 0.047 0.091 Union 0.341 0.401
ethnic minority (0.038) (0.150) coverage (0.244) (0.223)
Proportion 0.269 0.196 Company < 0.112 0.075
part-time (0.325) (0.177) 5 years old (0.105) (0.066)
Proportion 0.227 0.230 Non-plc 0.323 0.209
managerial (0.239) (0.274) company (0.460) (0.521)
Proportion 0.079 0.101 Public 0.293 0.443
technical (0.054) (0.055) sector (0.247) (0.270)
Proportion 0.105 0.065 Foreign 0.110 0.126
sales sta® (0.138) (0.084) ownership (0.070) (0.135)
Proportion 0.170 0.222 Production 0.198 0.139
clerical (0.149) (0.296) sector (0.161) (0.077)
Proportion 0.101 0.093 Part of 0.378 0.453
skilled (0.113) (0.092) large ¯rm (0.274) (0.221)
Proportion 0.154 0.160 Recent 0.397 0.512
over 50 (0.150) (0.147) sta® cuts (0.259) (0.456)
Proportion 0.067 0.048 Local 0.336 0.269
under 21 (0.082) (0.080) market (0.396) (0.288)
Competitive 0.565 0.527
market (0.591) (0.494)
¤ Of the 2,160 establishments, 9.3% (3.8% weighted) experienced an internal
grievance or Tribunal action based on alleged discrimination.
The ¯gures in Table 2 suggest some systematic di®erences between es-
tablishments that report recent experience of internal grievance or external
tribunal action and those that do not. Grievances tend to be encountered
by employers with relatively high proportions of ethnic minority sta®, but
not high proportions of female sta®. These employers also tend to have
11few part-time sta®, and a high degree of trade union coverage. The public
sector experiences a disproportionately large volume of allegations of dis-
crimination. However, all of these apparent in°uences are obscured by one
dominant factor: the e®ect of establishment size. It seems self-evident that
t h em o r ee m p l o y e e sa¯ r mh a s ,t h em o r el i k e l yi ti st oe x p e r i e n c eac o m p l a i n t
in any given period. Thus large establishments can be expected to appear
to be more subject to complaints of discrimination simply because they have
a greater exposure to risk of complaint. The importance of this e®ect is
underlined by the di®erence in the average workforce size of establishments
that receive complaints and those that do not: 982 compared to 215. This
also obscures the impact of other factors; for example, unionised and public
sector establishments tend to be large and will thus be subject to a higher
risk of complaint. It is clearly important to interpret the WERS data in the
context of a statistical model that makes reasonable allowance for this size
e®ect.
4 The econometric model
4.1 The wage model
O u rb a s i sf o re s t i m a t i n gt h ee m p l o y e r - s p e c i ¯ cd e g r e eo fr a c ea n dg e n d e rd i s -
advantage is a conventional wage equation that incorporates human capital
variables, together with job and employer descriptors. In formal terms, the
w a g em o d e li sa sf o l l o w s :
y
¤
ih = xih¯ + u0h +
R X
r=1
»
r
ihurh + ºih (3)
yih = j i® y
¤
ih 2 [Cj¡1;C j)( 4 )
where y¤
ih is the log of normal annual pay for the it hs a m p l e dw o r k e ri nt h ehth
sampled establishment. However, pay is not exactly observable in WERS:
instead, we only observe the interval (indexed by j) within which pay lies.
(¡1;C 1;:::;CJ¡1;1) are the known pre-determined (log) limits of these J
intervals. The categorical variable yih 2f 1:::Jg indicates the relevant range,
and the pair of variables fY L
ih;YU
ihg record its bounds, fCyih¡1;C yihg. xih is
12the row vector of relevant covariates; »r
ih is a binary indicator equal to 1 if
individual i in establishment h is a member of the rth disadvantaged group
and 0 otherwise. The variable u0h is the general unobserved e®ect speci¯c
to establishment h and, with its mean removed, can be interpreted as the
¯ r m - s p e c i ¯ cw a g ep r e m i u mf of section 2. The variable urh is the unobserv-
able speci¯c to the rth disadvantaged group (r =1 :::R)a te s t a b l i s h m e n t
h. If we take the contentious step of interpreting it as the (negative of) the
¯rm's degree of pay discrimination practised against group r,t h e nurh can
be regarded as the analogue of ¡d in section 2. Finally, ºih is an individual-
speci¯c random disturbance, assumed to have a normal distribution. The
parameters of the model are the coe±cient vector ¯, and the residual vari-
ance var(ºih)=¾2, together with any parameters that determine the form
of the distribution of uh.
De¯ne the shorthand: yh = fy1h:::ynhhg;Xh = fx1h:::xnhhg;¥h = f»r
ih;r=
1:::R;i =1 :::nhg and uh = fu1h:::uRhg. Then the conditional probability of
the pay levels of the sampled workers at establishment h is:
Pr(yhjXh;¥h;uh)=
nh Y
i=1
"
©
Ã
Y U
ih ¡ mih
¾
!
¡ ©
Ã
Y L
ih ¡ mih
¾
!#
(5)
where © is the distribution function of the standard normal and mih = xih¯+
u0h +
P
r »r
ihurh is the conditional mean function of y¤
ih.
4.2 The grievance process
We assume that workers can express their discontent in two ways: internally,
by making a formal complaint to the employer through a grievance procedure;
or externally, by making use of the Employment Tribunal system. Formalised
internal grievance procedures are now a near-universal element of internal
labour markets: 94% of WERS-sampled establishments reported that they
had such a procedure. They are thus an important part of the `voice' that
can be used by workers as an alternative to `exit' (Freeman, 1980).
Variations in establishment size prevent any simple interpretation of data
on the incidence of grievances. Even with an equal probability of complaint
from each individual, the probability of an establishment being grievance-free
in any period declines geometrically with the size of the workforce. Despite
the fact that grievances are observed only at the establishment level, it is
13important to work from individual-level foundations to avoid being misled
by this size e®ect.
Although it is possible for workers to make a tribunal application with
no preliminaries, we view this as a sequential two-stage process with inter-
nal grievances (implicit or explicit) preceding more serious external tribunal
proceedings. Assume that we identify two disadvantaged groups (r =1 ;2):
women and a composite ethnic minority group. There is a direct correspon-
dence between each group and a speci¯c type of grievance: women can initiate
grievances on grounds of sex discrimination and ethnic minority individuals
on grounds of race discrimination.3
For any member of the rth disadvantaged group, the probability of an
internal grievance is modelled as a probit:
Prh = Pr(grievance of type r jzh;uh)
=© ( zh°r + Ã1ru0h + Ã2rurh)( 6 )
where zh is a row vector of observed establishment characteristics and °r and
Ãjr are parameters. Thus P1h is the probability that an individual drawn
at random from the female section of the workforce will be found to have
initiated a grievance citing sex discrimination within the 1-year reference
period, and P2h is the analogous probability for ethnic minority employees
and race-related cases. Given these processes for the generation of internal
grievance cases, we assume that there is a ¯xed probability that any grievance
case will develop into a formal tribunal action:
Pr(tribunal jgrievance;zh;uh)=Q (7)
where Q is a ¯xed parameter.4
Assume that we can observe only whether or not any grievance of each
type has been experienced in the reference period, not their number. Assum-
ing individual independence, the resulting probability structure for either
type of discrimination case is:
Pr(no grievance or tribunal case jzh;uh)=( 1¡ Prh)
nrh (8)
3Although it is possible for men to take action on grounds of sex discrimination and
for whites to act on race discrimination, thes are rare occurrences. Note that the ethnic
minority and female groups may overlap, provided we allow the possibility that an ethnic
minority female can simultaneously initiate both types of grievance.
4Note that Q could be speci¯ed as another probit involving explanatory variables.
However, evidence presented below suggests that variation in Q is not signi¯cant.
14Pr(tribunal case jzh;uh)=1¡ (1 ¡ PrhQ)
nrh (9)
Pr(grievance, no tribunal case jzh;uh)=( 1¡ PrhQ)
nrh ¡ (1 ¡ Prh)
nrh (10)
where nrh is the number of workers of group r who are employed by estab-
lishment h.
In fact the WERS questionnaire only partially observes this distribu-
tion, since sex- and race-related grievance cases are not observed separately
(although Tribunal cases are). This further complication is discussed in Ap-
pendix 2. In general terms, if gh is used to represent the observed combination
of grievance/tribunal incidents, expressions analogous to (8)-(10) combine to
give the conditional model Pr(ghjzh;uh).
4.3 Stochastic speci¯cation
Since u is unobserved, estimation must be based on the distribution marginalised
with respect to the random e®ects. Let F be the distribution function of the
random e®ects. Then the distribution of the endogenous variables conditional
on the observable covariates is:
Pr(yh;g hjXh;zh;¥h)=
Z
Pr(yhjXh;¥h;u)Pr(ghjzh;u)dF(u) (11)
A variety of parametric and non-parametric approaches are available for es-
timating the distribution F and evaluating the multiple integral in (11). We
use the ¯nite mixture approach, in which F is speci¯ed as a general dis-
crete distribution with a ¯nite number of mass points, whose location and
associated probabilities are treated as parameters to be estimated. Thus:
Pr(yh;g hjXh;zh;¥h)=
S X
s=1
Pr(yhjXh;¥h;u
s)Pr(ghjzh;u
s)¼
s (12)
where the R-dimensional vectors us and the probabilities ¼s (s =1 :::S)a r e
unknown parameters subject only to the restrictions:
¼
s ¸ 0 (13)
S X
s=1
¼
s = 1 (14)
which are imposed by expressing the ¼s as multinomial logit functions of a
set of S ¡ 1 underlying parameters.
15If the number of mass points S is left to be determined freely by the
data, then this is the semi-parametric method advocated by Lindsay (1981)
and Heckman and Singer (1984). However, an alternative hybrid approach
is also widely used, where the number of mass points is treated formally as
a ¯xed number determined using conventional speci¯cation choice methods
based on hypothesis testing procedures or indicators such as the Akaike In-
formation Criterion (see Pudney, Galassi and Mealli, 1998). We use this
quasi-parametric approach here. The model was estimated by maximising
numerically a log-likelihood based on the distribution (12)5.
5E s t i m a t e s
5.1 The wage equation
The full set of wage equation estimates are given in Tables 3(a)-(e). The basic
wage model is an interval regression for the log wage, de¯ned as the respon-
dent's normal weekly pay. Only full-time workers (over 30 hours per normal
week) are included in the sample. The explanatory variables fall into four
groups and their sample properties are given in Tables 2 and A1. Individual
attributes include age, time spent in the current job, educational attainment,
trade union membership and health status, as well as gender and race which
are the main focus of the analysis. Job attributes are represented by the
incumbent's occupational class and also by a distinction between temporary
and permanent employment. Workforce composition variables summarise the
pro¯le of the stock of workers employed by the establishment at the time of
the survey. These record the pro¯le of the establishment's workforce in terms
of ethnicity, gender, occupation and age. Other establishment attributes in-
clude the size of the workforce, union coverage, company age, legal status,
sector and product market conditions.
Our ¯nal speci¯cation of the impact of individual ethnicity and gender
turns out to be quite simple. We began with an 8-category breakdown
formed from the interaction of the two gender groups with the following
four ethnic groups: Black (Afro-Caribbean and African); Indian; Pakistani
and Bangladeshi; and Other. When estimated as a simple interval regression
(with no random establishment e®ects), the intercepts for these eight groups
5Computation was done in GAUSS, using the MAXLIK procedure.
16could be represented adequately by three dummy variables. Two of these dis-
tinguish females and a separate ethnic minority group. The third indicates
ethnic minority women and thus captures an interaction e®ect, which is im-
portant since there is a signi¯cantly smaller race di®erential among women
than among men (see Bayard et. al., 1999). In this context, the ethnic minor-
ity group is de¯ned as the set of Blacks, Indians and Pakistani/Bangladeshis.
The restrictions embodied in this simpli¯cation can (just) be accepted at
the conventional 5% signi¯cance level, despite the large sample size. The
computed value for the corresponding Wald Â2( 4 )t e s tw a s8 :67, implying
a P-value of 7.0% (a robust covariance matrix estimate was used to take
account of sample clustering within ¯rms). Since there was virtually no dif-
ference between the restricted and unrestricted models in the estimates of
other coe±cients, this simpli¯cation was judged to be acceptable. It is also
particularly convenient, since it allows us to work with a single disadvantaged
racial group.
The stochastic speci¯cation for the random e®ects was arrived at by test-
ing down from an initial speci¯cation involving S = 12 mass points. The
tests were done using a likelihood ratio criterion with a conservative 20%
signi¯cance level. It proved impossible to estimate more than 10 mass points
without duplication and the testing sequence stopped at S =9 : In con-
trast with the experience of Pudney, Galassi and Mealli (1998) in a di®erent
context, this speci¯cation ¯ts considerably better than a Gaussian distri-
bution. The latter was estimated by simulated maximum likelihood, using
100 replications, antithetic variance reduction and 2nd-order bias correction.
Comparing estimators of the wage equation alone using the Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion, the ¯nite mixture model gave a value of 32.98, compared to
33.07 for the Gaussian model, so the former is preferred.6
For comparison, column 1 of Table 3 gives the results from a simple
individual-level wage model without employer e®ects. Column 2 of the table
gives the results for the random-e®ects wage equation estimated separately
from the grievance model, using a likelihood based on the distribution (5).
Column 3 of the table gives the analogous results for the full simultaneous
model (11).The last two models involve three establishment-speci¯c unob-
6We also estimated the full model under the Gaussian stochastic speci¯cation. We do
not present the results in detail here, but the conclusions were qualitatively similar to
those produced under the ¯nite mixture speci¯cation (see section 5). Thus the results do
not appear to be sensitive to stochastic speci¯cation.
17servables: a general e®ect u0h; a female-speci¯c e®ect u1h; and an ethnic
minority e®ect u2h. These three sets of results are broadly similar and con-
sistent with prior expectations. There are positive returns to job tenure and
union membership. The age pro¯le is inverse U-shape with a maximum at
around 45 years of age. Unmarried status and work-relevant health problems
are both associated with a signi¯cant wage premium. Returns to educational
attainment are around 6% for each of the successive stages up to university
degree level, which has an incremental return of around 10%. The character-
istics of the job are also important in°uences, with a large wage disadvantage
associated with temporary jobs and low status occupations.
The matched WERS dataset allows us to include covariates which de-
scribe the nature of the establishment in some detail. Workplaces employing
high proportions of female, part-time, young or old sta® tend to pay relatively
low wages, whilst those with high concentrations of ethnic minority workers
tend to pay higher than normal wage levels in general. Thus an ethnic mi-
nority worker employed by a `mainly white' establishment can expect to be
paid less than he or she would receive in a more mixed establishment. Ex-
actly the same would apply to a white worker. There is signi¯cant evidence
that the occupational pro¯le of an establishment is related to its wage-setting
behaviour. In particular, establishments with a high proportion of unskilled
labour tend to pay relatively low wages to all its employees (including those
who are not unskilled). Union coverage within the workplace (de¯ned as
the proportion of the workforce believed by management to be union mem-
bers) generates a small but signi¯cant wage premium for both members and
non-members, amounting to a 2% earnings di®erence between establishments
with complete and zero union coverage. Firm size has a positive in°uence
on wages, while public sector employment involves a moderate pay disadvan-
tage. Establishments with a high degree of foreign-ownership tend to pay
considerably higher than standard wages. The business conditions faced by
the employer also play a signi¯cant role. Establishments whose main product
market is local rather than regional, national or international are associated
with generally low pay levels. There is also evidence of rent sharing, with
highly competitive product market conditions implying slightly lower wage
levels.
18Table 3(a) Wage equation: personal characteristics
Simple interval Random-e®ects Simultaneous
Parameter regression wage model model
Job tenure / 10 0.062 0.071 0.071
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
TU member 0.066 0.059 0.059
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Age / 10 0.430 0.413 0.429
(0.022) (0.008) (0.008)
(Age / 10)2 -0.046 -0.044 -0.046
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Unmarried -0.092 -0.081 -0.078
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Low school 0.068 0.060 0.062
quali¯cation (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Intermediate school 0.134 0.120 0.122
quali¯cation (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Higher school 0.172 0.161 0.162
quali¯cation (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
University degree 0.289 0.269 0.270
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Postgraduate degree 0.354 0.340 0.341
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
Vocational -0.023 -0.013 -0.012
quali¯cation (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Health problem -0.045 -0.036 -0.036
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Ethnic minority woman 0.117 0.126 0.113
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
19Table 3(b) Wage equation: job characteristics
Simple interval Random-e®ects Simultaneous
Parameter regression interval regression model
Temporary job -0.120 -0.103 -0.102
(0.018) (0.012) (0.012)
Managerial / professional 0.564 0.548 0.549
(0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Technical 0.322 0.302 0.304
(0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
Clerical 0.117 0.104 0.106
(0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Craft / skilled manual 0.176 0.178 0.181
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
Service occupation 0.280 0.203 0.206
(0.022) (0.009) (0.010)
Sales 0.137 0.141 0.143
(0.021) (0.010) (0.010)
Operative 0.020 0.040 0.044
(0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
20Table 3(c) Wage equation: workforce composition e®ects
Simple interval Random-e®ects Simultaneous
Parameter regression interval regression model
Proportion of women -0.211 -0.191 -0.177
(0.026) (0.020) (0.020)
Proportion ethnic 0.225 0.209 0.202
minority (0.046) (0.040) (0.037)
Proportion part-time -0.284 -0.269 -0.280
sta® (0.034) (0.022) (0.022)
Proportion managerial 0.164 0.188 0.184
sta® (0.023) (0.018) (0.019)
Proportion technical 0.077 0.141 0.155
sta® (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)
Proportion sales sta® 0.235 0.196 0.204
(0.035) (0.023) (0.023)
Proportion clerical 0.247 0.276 0.278
sta® (0.025) (0.019) (0.018)
Proportion skilled 0.010 0.015 0.021
manual sta® (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
Proportion sta® -0.210 -0.156 -0.147
over 50 (0.044) (0.032) (0.033)
Proportion sta® -0.426 -0.316 -0.301
under 21 (0.075) (0.040) (0.041)
21Table 3(d) Wage equation: other establishment characteristics
Simple interval Random-e®ects Simultaneous
Parameter regression interval regression model
ln(employment) 0.027 0.022 0.026
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Union coverage 0.011 0.002 0.004
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Company < 5y e a r so l d -0.017 -0.020 -0.017
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Non-plc private status -0.009 -0.018 -0.015
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Public sector -0.039 -0.021 -0.018
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Degree of foreign 0.113 0.136 0.137
ownership (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Production sector 0.003 -0.015 -0.012
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Part of large ¯rm -0.004 0.006 0.000
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Recent sta® cuts -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Local product market -0.023 -0.033 -0.027
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Highly competitive -0.033 -0.028 -0.025
market (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
225.2 The random e®ects distribution
Our preferred speci¯cation is a 9-point trivariate discrete distribution for the
establishment e®ects. The implied means, standard deviations and corre-
lations of the three establishment e®ects u0h ... u2h are given in Table 4.
The means of the race- and gender-speci¯c e®ects are similar and imply an
average pay disadvantage of around 16% for both women and ethnic minori-
ties. However, the positive coe±cient estimated for the interaction dummy
variable (in Table 3(a) above) implies that ethnic minority females face an
average pay disadvantage of roughly 21% rather than the 32% that would be
implied by cumulation of the separate gender and ethnicity e®ects. Another
way of putting this is to say that racial pay di®erentials are on average 17%
for men but only 5% for women. The variances of the ¯rm e®ects are all
clearly signi¯cant. The variance of the general establishment e®ect is almost
double that of the gender e®ect and three times that of the race e®ect. The
signi¯cant negative correlation b ½02 implies that high-wage ¯rms tend to have
a higher degree of racial disadvantage. This ¯nding was rationalised theoret-
ically in section 2 where we showed that high-wage ¯rms can expect to be
less vulnerable to discrimination complaints. However, for this explanation
to be empirically plausible, we need to show that high-wage ¯rms do indeed
experience a relatively low rate of grievance.
23Table 4 Wage equation: random e®ects
Simple interval Random-e®ects Simultaneous
Parameter regression interval regression model
Mean of general 4.326 4.347 4.285
e®ect (u0) (0.055) (0.028) (0.029)
Mean of female -0.161 -0.166 -0.153
e®ect (u1) (0.006) (0.020) (0.021)
Mean of race -0.175 -0.164 -0.166
e®ect (u2) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006)
Std dev (u0) - 0.158 0.158
(0.005) (0.005)
Std dev (u1) - 0.105 0.102
(0.025) (0.033)
Std dev (u2) - 0.096 0.095
(0.008) (0.009)
b ¾ 0.298 0.258 0.259
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Correlations
b ½01 - 0.005 0.012
(0.189) (0.235)
b ½02 - -0.392 -0.393
(0.056) (0.056)
b ½12 - -0.320 -0.290
(0.278) (0.344)
5.3 The grievance process
Tables 5 (a,b) give estimates of the grievance processes. The ¯rst set of re-
sults, in column 1 are arrived at by applying probit analysis to explain the
distinction between establishments with or without a reported grievance or
tribunal action. Note that this model takes no account of the misleading size
e®ect and it also ignores any impact of unobservable ¯rm e®ects. The Wald
Â2 test on the coe±cients is highly signi¯cant and their pattern is broadly
consistent with the crude sample di®erences shown in Table 2, with estab-
lishment size, ethnic pro¯le and public sector being particularly important.
24In contrast, column 2 of the table gives the results of a probit analysis for the
probability of a sex- or race-discrimination tribunal case estimated for the
set of 201 establishments that experienced at least a an internal grievance.
Here, the probit coe±cients are of only marginal signi¯cance (P-value = 6%)
and the assumption of a constant grievance to tribunal transition probability
(equation (7) above) seems reasonable.
The last two columns of Table 5 (a,b) show the estimated grievance co-
e±cients estimated from the simultaneous model. The residual size e®ect in
Table 5(b) is largely eliminated. Race-related individual grievance probabil-
ities are estimated to be insigni¯cantly related to establishment size, whilst
individual sex-discrimination grievance probabilities are signi¯cantly lower
in large establishments. This is in sharp contrast with the strongly positive
crude association in the sample.
25Table 5(a) Grievance model: workforce composition e®ects
Probit for Conditional Simultaneous Simultaneous
internal probit for model: sex model: race
Parameter discrimination Tribunal discrimination discrimination
grievance case grievance grievance
Proportion of -0.126 1.331 -1.082 0.493
women (0.281) (0.527) (0.211) (0.266)
Proportion 1.309 -0.267 0.263 -1.744
ethnic minority (0.319) (0.723) (0.260) (0.360)
Proportion -0.729 -1.569 -0.111 -0.829
part-time sta® (0.293) (0.611) (0.213) (0.374)
Proportion -0.125 -0.211 -0.149 -0.484
managerial sta® (0.212) (0.446) (0.151) (0.244)
Proportion -0.401 -0.111 -0.017 -0.894
technical sta® (0.288) (0.656) (0.213) (0.294)
Proportion 0.134 0.622 -0.027 0.182
sales sta® (0.254) (0.611) (0.213) (0.294)
Proportion 0.333 -0.737 0.324 -0.353
clerical sta® (0.218) (0.541) (0.181) (0.336)
Proportion 0.109 -0.009 -0.139 0.346
skilled manual (0.273) (0.511) (0.271) (0.245)
Union -0.348 -0.328 -0.150 0.051
coverage (0.140) (0.364) (0.135) (0.181)
26Table 5(b) Grievance model: other establishment characteristics
Probit for Conditional Simultaneous Simultaneous
internal probit for model: sex model: race
Parameter discrimination Tribunal discrimination discrimination
grievance case grievance grievance
ln(workforce) 0.434 0.166 -0.096 -0.022
(0.037) (0.075) (0.025) (0.042)
Company -0.248 0.237 -0.179 -0.210
< 5y e a r so l d (0.161) (0.336) (0.129) (0.151)
Public sector 0.338 0.510 0.137 0.321
(0.112) (0.256) (0.091) (0.143)
Production -0.374 0.096 -0.248 -0.027
sector (0.132) (0.311) (0.113) (0.142)
Intercept -3.361 -1.166 -4.261 -3.202
(0.248) (0.514) (1.106) (2.051)
Establishment - - 0.500 0.213
e®ect ( b Ã1) (0.250) (0.483)
Gender e®ect - - -0.383 -
( b Ã2) (0.738)
Race e®ect - -0.321
( b Ã3r) (1.325)
Tribunal
transition - - 0.486
probability (0.037)
Sample size 2160 201 2160
Wald test Â2(13)=182.2 Â2(13)=21.9 -
5.4 Implications and robustness of the results
The simple theoretical model outlined in section 2 predicts that there should
be a negative impact of all three establishment e®ects on the probability
of worker grievance. High wage ¯rms (large u1)s h o u l dh a v eal o w e rr a t e
of grievance per individual, whereas we have found a marginally signi¯cant
higher rate. As the model predicts, we have found that discriminatory ¯rms
27(small u1, u2) have higher grievance rates, but these e®ects are small and not
statistically signi¯cant. We have found a signi¯cant tendency for high wage
¯rms to have a slightly greater than expected degree of racial disadvantage,
which theory does suggest as a possible implication. However, the mechanism
by which this would occur requires that u0 have a negative impact on the
grievance probability and we have found the opposite.
It is not possible to assess the magnitude of the estimated impact of the
establishment e®ects ur by looking at the coe±cients alone. We evaluate the
following estimated mean grievance probabilities as functions of the general
establishment e®ect (u0) and the gender- and race-speci¯c e®ects (u1, u2):
¼r(ur)=
PH
h=1 whnh©(zh°r + Ã1ru0 + Ã2rur)
PH
h=1 whnh
; r =1 ;2 (15)
where r = 1 indicates sex discrimination cases and r =2i n d i c a t e sr a c e
discrimination cases. The variables wh and nh are respectively the survey
weight and the size of workforce of establishment h.I n ¯ g u r e s 3 - 6 , t h e s e
mean probabilities are plotted against the relevant establishment e®ects, to-
gether with 90% pointwise asymptotic con¯dence bands which allow for the
parameter estimation error.
Figure 3 shows a small and poorly determined estimated impact of the
male-female pay di®erential on the probability of a grievance based on al-
leged sex-discrimination. On these ¯gures, raising the degree of discrimina-
tion from a 0% to a 25% pay di®erential would only increase the grievance
probability from 0.1% to 0.14%. Figure 4 shows that the evidence for an
impact of pay di®erentials on the grievance probability is even weaker in the
case of race discrimination, at least in part because the much smaller num-
ber of sampled minority workers leads to lower statistical precision. Figure
5 shows a more de¯nite result on the general establishment e®ect u0,w h e r e
moving from the bottom to the top of its estimated range results in a dou-
bling of the probability of a grievance based on sex discrimination. This is
statistically signi¯cant, but not large enough to be of much practical signi¯-
cance. In ¯gure 6, there is no evidence of any impact on the probability of a
race-discrimination grievance.
28Figure 3 The impact of the gender pay di®erential (u1) on the probability
of expressed grievance
(u0 set at its mean; dashed lines are 90% pointwise con¯dence bands)
Figure 4 The impact of the racial pay di®erential (u2) on the probability of
a race-discrimination grievance
(u0 set at its mean; dashed lines are 90% pointwise con¯dence bands)
29Figure 5 The impact of the general establishment e®ect (u0)o nt h e
probability of a sex discrimination grievance
(u1 set at its mean; dashed lines are 90% pointwise con¯dence bands)
Figure 6 The impact of the general establishment e®ect (u1)o nt h e
probability of a race discrimination grievance
(u2 set at its mean; dashed lines are 90% pointwise con¯dence bands)
30What might be the explanation for these unexpected results? The the-
oretical model of section 2 is clearly too simple in several respects. One is
that it ignores the costs incurred by complainants when they initiate an ac-
tion. In purely ¯nancial terms, this assumption is quite realistic. In a 1992
survey of cases (Department of Employment, 1994), the median total cost
to an employer of a tribunal case (including time, fees and compensation)
amounted to $1500 and $2300 for sex and race discrimination cases respec-
tively, compared to only $49 as the median cost to an employee. However,
there are undoubtedly other intangible costs that could be important. If a
¯xed cost C is introduced into the model, then the curves d=(1 ¡ P)a n d
Pd=(1¡P) are replaced by (d¡C)=(1¡P)a n d( Pd¡C)=(1¡P). Thus the
two curves shown in ¯gure 1 are shifted downwards and become shallower.
This has the e®ect of increasing the critical value of d at which the probability
of grievance becomes positive and raising the relative frequency of quitting
following an unsuccessful complaint. However, the major implications of the
theory are not changed and costs of action seem unlikely to be responsible
for the counter-intuitive results we have found.7
Another possible extension to the model brings into consideration the pro-
cess of job matching. If there are systematic di®erences between individuals
in their readiness or ability to lodge a grievance, it is likely to be the more
educated, able or ambitious workers who have the greatest propensity to use
grievance procedures in any given situation.8 If there is also some tendency
for the labour market to assign such individuals to high-wage ¯rms, then this
might generate the association that we have found in the data. To pursue
this further would require us to distinguish between worker-speci¯c unobserv-
ables and true ¯rm e®ects (see Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999). We
are unable to do this empirically, since WERS does not yield repeated obser-
vations on workers and we cannot observe the earnings of each worker with
7If ¯nancial costs were large and if workers act on an expected utility rather than
an expected gain basis, this conclusion could change. Workers employed by high-wage
¯rms may be systematically wealthier than others and thus more prepared to absorb
costs, resulting in a countervailing tendency towards higher rates of grievance for high-
wage ¯rms. However, this would depend critically on the nature of preferences and the
structure of costs and rewards. It seems implausible that this e®ect could be strong enough
to account for our results.
8Although they would also have better exit options, which would tend to reduce the
grievance probability.
31as e q u e n c eo fe m p l o y e r s . C o n s e q u e n t l yw eh a v en ow a yo fs e p a r a t i n g¯ r m
e®ects from ¯rm-averages of individual worker e®ects. If ¯rms identi¯ed as
high-wage ¯rms tend to be so because they hire and retain high-productivity
workers and if high productivity workers have in turn a higher propensity
to take action for any given degree of discrimination, then we might indeed
expect to observe the results that have emerged from the WERS data.
A third related issue is quitting behaviour. Exit without resort to com-
plaint procedures may be the preferred option of many victims of discrimi-
nation. Since WERS does not yield direct observations on turnover at the
individual level, this cannot be studied directly. However, it does suggest
that individual job tenure and the variables used to describe the gender
and ethnicity composition of the workforce may be endogenous to the dis-
crimination/grievance process. A reduced-form approach would treat these
as jointly-determined variables and omit them from the wage equation and
the grievance model. To implement this, the grievance model has been re-
speci¯ed as a single probit for the binary distinction between establishments
experiencing any discrimination-based grievance or tribunal action and those
experiencing no such complaints. This probit includes all establishment de-
scriptors except for the gender and ethnic composition variables. We take
account of the ¯rm size e®ect as follows:
Pr(grievance or tribunal j z;u0;u 1;u 2)
=1 ¡ [1 ¡ ©(z°
¤ + Ã
¤
0u0 + Ã
¤
1u1 + Ã
¤
2u2]
n (16)
where n is the total number of employees. The results from estimation of
this respeci¯ed model turn out to be remarkably similar to those presented
above. The estimates of Ã¤
0:::Ã¤
2 are 0.026, -0.047 and -0.050 respectively
and they are separately and jointly insigni¯cant at any reasonable signi¯cant
level. Thus there is no evidence to suggest that the endogeneity of workforce
composition is masking a strong link between pay di®erentials and grievance
probabilities.
Yet another possibility, of course, is that economic models of the grievance
process, emphasising the rational evaluation by individuals of alternative
options, might be stressing the wrong aspect of behaviour. Grievances are
rare and rather extreme events, unpleasant for all parties involved. The
important aspects of behaviour may be those emphasised by the psychology,
rather than the economics, of individual con°ict and may have little to do
with the quanti¯able economic gains and losses involved.
326C o n c l u s i o n s
The British system of anti-discrimination policy relies heavily on individual
workers to bring forward complaints. For this system to work well, it is
important that bad cases of discrimination have a high probability of being
raised as matters for complaint. We have certainly found evidence consis-
tent with the belief that labour market discrimination remains an unsolved
problem. Using WERS98 data, we have found highly signi¯cant evidence of
employer-speci¯c pay disadvantage for women and members of ethnic minor-
ity groups. However, this disadvantage varies signi¯cantly across employers,
so there is no blanket conclusion that can be drawn about the nature of
discrimination.
Simple theoretical arguments suggest that we should observe use by work-
ers of grievance or tribunal procedures to be increasing in the degree of pay
discrimination practised by the employer and decreasing in the general wage
premium (relative to the going market rate) o®ered by the employer. Instead,
we have found little evidence of any link between the employer-speci¯c level
of pay disadvantage and the rate of grievance expressed by employees. More-
over, the rate of complaint appears to be positively, rather than negatively,
related to the general wage premium paid by the employer. This suggests
that resort to grievance and tribunal procedures may have more to do with
the `quality' of the ¯rm's workforce than it does with the magnitude of the
`discrimination' problem within the establishment. It may be that high-wage
¯rms tend to employ the kind of workers who are better able to cope with
the di±cult and demanding process of pressing a complaint e®ectively. This
would in turn suggest that it is often vulnerable people whose economic po-
sition is already very weak - low-skilled employees of low-wage ¯rms - who
are least likely to be helped by the Tribunal system.
If this highly contentious conclusion were accepted, it would imply that in-
ternal grievance procedures and external Employment Tribunals are in prac-
tice rather ine®ective as anti-discrimination devices. Certainly our empirical
results point in this direction and are consistent with the low success rate
of discrimination-based Tribunal applications. Other legislative approaches
which are less reliant upon individual complaints procedures may be more
promising avenues for policy-makers to explore.
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36Appendix 1: Sample properties of variables
Table A1 Sample means of personal characteristics
(unweighted, n =2 0 ;660)
Variable Mean
Job tenure (years) 6.98
Union member (dummy) 0.442
Age (years) 39.6
Unmarried (dummy) 0.226
Vocational quali¯cation 0.394
Health problem 0.054
Temporary job 0.022
Occupation :::
Managerial / professional 0.305
Technical 0.110
Clerical 0.205
Craft / skilled manual 0.096
Service occupation 0.055
Sales 0.043
Operative 0.100
Ethnicity :::
Ethnic minority man 0.015
Ethnic minority woman 0.014
Ethnic majority man 0.559
Ethnic majority woman 0.412
Highest educational qualification :::
Low school quali¯cation (GCSE grade D or E or equivalent) 0.104
Intermediate school quali¯cation (GCSE grade A, B, C or equivalent) 0.251
Higher school quali¯cation (A-levels or equivalent) 0.162
University degree 0.203
Postgraduate degree 0.072
37Appendix 2: Grievance probabilities
WERS yields three pieces of information relevant to the occurrence of
grievance and Tribunal actions within the 12 months prior to the survey.
Internal grievances based on allegations of race and sex discrimination are
not recorded separately, while sex and race discrimination Tribunal cases are
separated. However, within these three categories, only occurrence is ob-
served, and not their number. Note that, in the few cases where Tribunal
action is recorded without any internal grievance, we record this as an oc-
currence of both together. Consider a particular establishment, and either
one of the disadvantaged groups. Let Pr be the grievance probabilities, as
de¯ned in (4) for group r,w h e r er = 1 for women and r = 2 for the ethnic
minority, and let Q be the conditional Tribunal probability (5). As a (good)
approximation we assume that sex discrimination cases are only brought by
women and race discrimination cases are only brought by members of the
ethnic minority group; n1 and n2 are the sizes of these groups within the
workforce. There are ¯ve possible observational regimes which occur with
the following probabilities.
Pr(no grievance or tribunal case) = (1 ¡ P1)n1(1 ¡ P2)n2
Pr(sex and/or race grievance, no tribunal case)
= Pr(no tribunal case) ¡ Pr(no sex or race grievance)
=( 1¡ P1Q)n1(1 ¡ P2Q)n2 ¡ (1 ¡ P1)n1(1 ¡ P2)n2
Pr(sex and/or race grievance, sex discrimination tribunal case only)
=[ 1¡ (1 ¡ P1Q)n1](1¡ P2Q)n2
Pr(sex and/or race grievance, race discrimination tribunal case only)
=( 1¡ P1Q)n1 [1 ¡ (1 ¡ P2Q)n2]
Pr(sex and/or race grievance, sex and race discrimination tribunal cases)
=[ 1¡ (1 ¡ P1Q)n1][1¡ (1 ¡ P2Q)n2]
These expressions form the distribution Pr(ghjzh;uh) which enters the full
sample distribution Pr(yh;g hjXh;zh;¥h;uh) and thus the likelihood function
(12).
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